Since Obamas announcement last week that he will normalize relations with Cuba, a number of commentators have analyzed what impact this might have on US-Iranian ties, particularly with respect to the ongoing negotiations on Irans nuclear program.
Aside from neoconservatives, such asElliott Abrams, and other hawks, likeLindsey Graham and John McCainwho predictably deplored the move and worried that Obamas move portends US surrender at the negotiating tablethe Wilson Centers Aaron David Miller was one of the first to do a morethoughtful analysisof what it might mean for Iran policy. In his post, entitled After Cuba Comes Iran, Miller argued that, despite the key differences between the two countries, Obamas decision to normalize ties with Havana should be a clear sign of where he might like to go with Iran on the nuclear issue in coming months.
Paul Pillar, a regular contributor to theNational Interest, alsoalluded to the possibilitythat the Cuba initiative, coupled with Obamas more assertive policy shifts on immigration and climate change, could indeed indicate where Obama wants to go with Iran and expressed the hope that these moves will encourage him to inject into the US negotiating position theflexibility that will be neededto conclude an agreement.
In another important contribution published by Voice of America on Tuesday, the Atlantic Councils Iran expert, Barbara Slavinarguedwhat Ive been thinking (but hadnt put pen to paper) for the past week:
For those in the Iranian government who are pushing for a long-term nuclear deal with Washington, seeing Obama use his presidential authority to relieve the embargo against Cuba despite the vocal objection of some in Congress should increase confidence that he canwaive key nuclear-related sanctionsagainst Iran in a similar fashion.
In my opinion, Obamas willingness to make a bold foreign policy move that is certain to provoke heated opposition from not insignificant domestic constituencies (that are also overrepresented in Congress) shouldcontrary to the narratives put out by the neoconservatives and other hawksactually strengthen the Rouhani-Zarif faction within the Iran leadership who are no doubt arguing that Obama is serious both about reaching an agreement and forging a new relationship with the Islamic Republic.
I asked Farideh Farhiwhose analysis of internal Iranian politics and foreign policy is, as far as LobeLog (among many others) is concerned, the best availableabout this Wednesday. She replied by email as follows:
I think Obama did himself a lot of good in changing the perception of him in Iran, as well as the rest of the world, as a weak and indecisive president. I think that perception just received a beating and will help those in Tehran who are making the case that Obama is serious and can deliver on substantial sanctions relief or that he is the best person to deal with (given the fact that he is relieved of election pressures). To be sure, all this will be focused on nuclear negotiations and not normalization of relations that developed in the Cuba situation, but if it happens, it will certainly be a breakthrough that may gradually open the path towards normalization.
Farideh pointed in particular to theofficial reactionby Irans Foreign Ministry to Obamas Cuba announcement as offering some indication about how it was being interpreted in Tehran. That statement emphasized the presidents acknowledgment that more than 50 years of isolation and sanctions against Cuba had not worked and I do not believe we can continue doing the same thing for over five decades and expect a different result. Obamas remarks about having learned from hard-earned experience that countries are more likely to enjoy lasting transformation if their people are not subjected to chaos, according to Farideh, were also likely to be seen favorably in Tehran as Obamas repudiation of regime change. (Related points were made in another analysis,If Its True on Cuba, Its True on Iran,published in the Huffington Post by Trita Parsi and Ryan Costello shortly after Obamas announcement.)
I would add that the fact that the Castro brothers, who have resisted Yanqui imperialism and global arrogance for even longer than Tehran, are now willing to establish a new relationship with their own Great Satan may also count for something in the internal debate that swirls around Ayatollah Khameneis office. If, after all, revolutionary Cuba is willing to turn the page with their historic nemesisdefiance of which has largely defined Cubas out-sized standing and status in the worldshouldnt hardcore revolutionaries around Ayatollah Khamenei at least consider the idea, if not of normalisation (which appears out of the question for the moment), then at least moving with greater confidence toward some rapprochement?
That view is shared by Kenneth Katzman, the senior analyst of Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Persian Gulf Affairs at the Congressional Research Service. I think we should also not minimize how the Cuba rapprochement might play in the inner counsels in Tehran, he said in an email. Surely, Rouhani and Zarif can now go to the Supreme Leader and say The Castro brothers are at least as distrustful of the United States as you are, and they were able to reach a deal with the United States. Why wouldnt you do the same??
Of course, opponents of Obamas normalization of ties with Cuba will try to rally a Republican-led Congress behind their efforts to restrain Obamas efforts by, among other measures, denying funding for an embassy, refusing to confirm a nominee as ambassador, and introducing legislation designed to constrain the presidents authority to waive or lift certain sanctions or further ease the trade embargo. And, if they succeed, particularly with respect to the sanctions issue, theres no doubt that such action will be used by hard-liners in Tehran to argue that Obama lacks the power to follow through on any promises he makes about lifting sanctions and related concessions, in a nuclear deal.
But its pretty clear that Obama is determined to fight such actions, and its most unlikely that anti-Castro diehards like Marco Rubio and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen will be able to gather enough Democratic supporters to overcome a presidential veto. Indeed, given the strong support for Obamas action from such quarters as the US Chamber of Commerce, the National Foreign Trade Council, and various agricultural lobby groups whose members are eager to significantly increase their exports to Cuba, normalizations foes may find it more difficult than they anticipate to rally a large majority of Republicans behind them despite the party leaderships determination to deny Obama any kind of foreign policy success.
At the same time, any serious effort by the anti-Castro forces on Capitol Hill will pose some difficult questions for key players on Iran, especially the Israel lobby and the various groups associated with it. The Cuba and Israel lobbies have worked closely together for decadestheir common interests have converged perfectly in the persons of the outgoing chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and former House Foreign Committee chair Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. And now is the moment when theCuba lobbyneeds all the help it can get. Moreover, if the leadership of the Israel lobby believes that normalization with Cuba will make a nuclear deal and rapprochement with Iran substantially more likely, will it decide that this is a fight worth fighting? Of course, the leadership is not monolithic, especially on a question that, at least on the face of it, is so far removed from Israel itself, and it will be very difficult to mobilize all but the lobbys most right-wing constituents behind preventing normalization with Cuba. But it will be fascinating to watch.