TEHRAN, Nov. 17 (MNA) – With the hard-pressing issue of ISIL developing terrorist networks in France, the question still lingers on: how French intelligence apparatus failed to see such networks and remained passive.The French media have experimented with analysis of security situation in the wake of chain terrorist attacks and explosions in Paris last Friday (November 13); however, the same hard-pressing questions have not been duly formulated by the French media; nor it have been responded by the French authorities; the issue of ‘making question’ suffers a systematic flaw, and with it a response is desperately needed.
A work division has taken place: the media are busy with the drawing precise outline of the crisis as it happened; intelligence machinery on the other hand, is doing its own job of post-mortem management of the situation; this has created a pandemonium of public opinion which has not yet found a response to its legitimate concerns, on rise in daily basis.
Some media, mainstream and otherwise, wage a laudable attempt to address these concerns in a more superficial way than in a systematically committed manner, which belies its own well-organized and dictated nature as well; for example, France Presse quotes intelligence observers that “ISIL has shown enjoying of a complex network of mercenaries beyond its native lands now ruling in the Middle East during its recent Paris attacks, networks which are well-organized and equipped to prepare strong terrorist onslaught in mainland Europe.”
The question is that when, from where, and how ISIL developed such a complex network of loyal extremists inside France; from this premise, it follows that why French intelligence apparatus systematically failed in detecting the ‘networks of terror’ which had been taking place under their own control; networking does need round characters and complex expert guys, and is not an amateur undertaking.
If the answer is no, so why the suspects or at least, potential suspects had been freely working in networking and successfully circumvented French intelligence machinery?
What is partially easy for a conjecture is that strong networking which evades native intelligence arrangements in place in France is a demanding task, as Paris attacks clearly indicated, it was professional and complex in choosing methods in achieving objectives; on the end of this chain are suicide bombers and or shooters, which act as mere pawns of the network. The fact that ISIL did establish the network under the eyes of French intelligence and with their tacit agreement is far from being doubted; this is an area where issue rises why French intelligence system failed to keep these networks under their surveillance.
Here the hypothesis comes to explain dark parts of the scene: that ISIL had infiltrated the intelligence system or at least had their consent in freely operating; if the former seems improbable, the latter is not an issue which could be easily ignored or denied; what happened in Paris in Friday evening, was a product of a mid-range planning and coordination after shootings which killed the Charlie Hebdo staff over prophet cartoons case. Here ‘randomness’ and ‘probability’ fail to stand as explaining factors; in post-disaster response and management, a sense of intentionality and contrivance shows itself to inquiring eyes; put in other words, Paris attacks should not be taken as a simple plan with obvious components; French government should be taken responsible for the terrorist acts more than any other suspects; this is an issue which would prove quite unpalatable for the French intelligence officials as well. As times go by, the public opinion in France will push questions forward in search of a viable answer.