28 Mar 2024
Saturday 23 December 2017 - 16:13
Story Code : 287414

This is why Trump's strategy for Iran will fail

American Herald Tribune | Sahar Nowrouzzadeh,Reid Pauly & Mahsa Rouhi: Although a range of legislative and executive options remain in play, Congress window to expedite the reimposition of sanctions lifted under the Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA) has closed.

The sixty-day clock to do so began running on October 13, when President Trump announced his comprehensive Iran strategy, which included the decertification of the Iran nuclear deal to Congress. The product of a complete strategic review, the strategy wasdescribedas aiming to counter the regimes destabilizing activity and support for terrorist proxies, block their financing of terror, address the regimes proliferation of missiles, and deny all paths to a nuclear weapon. Trump focused on employing coercive tools such as sanctions and threats, including a threat to abrogate the JCPOA absent fixes, and appeals to the Iranian people that signaled a possible shift towards the pursuit of regime change. The strategy aims to compel Iran to change its policies and European allies to fall in line with the U.S. approach. We evaluate the strategy from the perspective of coercive bargaining theorya pillar of American foreign policyand find that it lacks key components for success. Namely, it too heavily rely on threats, disregards the role of coercive assurances and incentives, introduces unlimited aims and neglects diplomatic engagement.

Holding the Nuclear Deal Hostage

In international relations, coercive diplomacy is the art of making threats to affect a targets decisionmaking. Threats communicate punishments that will follow noncompliance with specific demands. Most people intuit the value of credible threats. Yet, in threatening to dismantle the JCPOA, Trump has forgotten that successful coercion also requires credible assurance that a targets compliance with demands will result in reciprocal restraint.

As any good diplomat or dealmaker knows, and Nobel LaureateThomas Schellinghas famously said, you cannot communicate stop or Ill shoot, without implying that if you do stop, I wont shoot. Trump has made clear that he preferred to rip up the worst deal ever, undermining the credibility of any coercive assurance not to abrogate it, even if Iran makes additional concessions. This is just poor coercion. Threats without credible assurance are merely bullyingdarned if you do and darned if you dontand one should not expect them to succeed.

Assurances are also distinct from incentives or carrots, which entice states to strike or abide by diplomatic bargains, and complement coercive bargaining. Trumps Iran strategy is equally devoid of so called more for more offers to build upon the JCPOA with additional incentives.

So often policymakers fail to appreciate the breadth of coercive tools at their disposal. In the case of U.S.-Iran relations, however, the elements of coercive success are staring the Trump administration in the face.

Coercive Assurances and Compellent Success with Iran

The JCPOA was the product of years of coercive diplomacy with Iran by the P5+1 and European Union. Credible threats were critical, but so were credible assurances and incentives. The threat of continued or increased multilateral sanctions provided significant leverage and the threat of unilateral airstrikes backstopped the negotiations. At the same time, as part of its calculus to adhere to the deals strict terms, Iran understood (in part based on thetextof the JCPOA) that in exchange for its compliance it was gaining credible assurances. These included the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions and Irans perceived reprieve from the looming threat of American (or Israeli) military action against its nuclear facilities so long as the deal held. The incentive of maintaining a civilian enrichment program also played a major role in Irans calculations.

The Obama administration seems to have understood the important role of coercive assurances in securing and maintaining Iranian compliance with nuclear constraints. For example, they recognized that just as sanctions required significant international engagement to serve as credible threats, similar efforts were needed to ensure that the assurance of lifting of nuclear-related sanctions was also credible. Sucheffortsincluded U.S. officials consistently engaging international banks and businesses to clarify the scope of legitimate business with Iran and explain remaining nonnuclear sanctions. While a host of Irans policies continued to deter foreign investment independent of sanctions, these actions demonstrated the credibility of U.S. coercive assurances.

In contrast, the Trump administration has not only ceased communications clarifying the lifting of sanctions, Trump has broadlydiscouragedany business with Iran and threatened towithdrawfrom the accordall despite Irans continuedverifiedcompliance. These developments have led Iran to accuse the United States of violating specificarticlesof the deal that refer to good faith efforts to sustain this JCPOA and prevent interference with the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions. Given such factors, Trumps new Iran strategy appears to fail the tests of coercive assurance.

Reintroducing Regime Change

The Trump administration has also reintroduced the threat of regime change, including in remarks bySecretary of State Rex TillersonandSecretary of Defense Jim Mattispublicly expressing a desire to see a transition of Irans government.

It is unlikely that Tehran truly fears the threat of an Iraq-style ground invasion. Iran perceives that its regional position has strengthened since 2003, along with its ability to deter by engaging in asymmetric warfare. Moreover, rising instability and the perception of American fatigue in the Middle East cast a pall on brute-force options. Nevertheless, statements alluding to regime change unhelpfully exacerbate Irans threat perceptions that survival of the regime is at stake. Such boundless intentions foreclose coercive bargaining space and contribute to domestic political constraints in Iran that preclude the leadership from engaging with the West. Moreover, regime change is an unlimited aiman existential threatthat undermines a coercers ability to make credible assurances to secure concessions.

The Strategy is Flawed

According to Trumps America First foreign policy, his administration will embrace diplomacy and even work to potentially see old enemies become friends. Yet, despite delivering his October 13 Iran strategy remarks in the Diplomatic Reception Room at the White House, Trump ironically failed to once mention diplomacy or talks with Iran; he even failed to negotiate a better deal. Despitereportsof an isolated attempt, the Trump administration has not indicated that it plans to incorporate hard-won, high-level channels of communication to Iran into its new strategy. Nor are its actions likely to allow space for such engagement. Instead, Trumps foreign policy and dealmaking philosophy appears centered on threats that await capitulation.

Trumps strategy appears to be one of brinkmanshiprocking the boat in hopes that the other party is less risk-tolerant and will give in before the boat capsizes. This is dangerous in light of Irans potential to jump ship with other parties to the JCPOA. Allies have long shared U.S. concerns regarding a range of Irans policies, but they have thus farrejectedTrumps approach. Instead they have voiced support for the deal and a balance between pressure and engagement to address remaining problems with Iran. When coupled with no apparent limits to his aims, it is difficult to imagine Iran, or close American allies for that matter, falling in line.

While the sixty-day window to snap-back sanctions has closed, many question lie ahead for Congress and the administration. If Trump takes seriously the goal of fixing the JCPOA, reining in Irans ballistic-missile development or curbing its regional activities and influence, he and Congress would be wise to recognize the importance of maintaining credible assurances, avoiding less-than-credible threats, and offering incentives when appropriate. Absent changes, Trumps strategy is deeply flawed and is likely to weaken, not strengthen, the coercive bargaining position of the United States going forward.

Sahar Nowrouzzadehis a joint research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Iran Project and Project on Managing the Atom. She has focused on Iran under three U.S. administrations and served as the Director for Iran and Iran Nuclear Implementation on the White House National Security Council (NSC) staff from 2014 to 2016.Reid Paulyis a joint research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs International Security Program and Project on Managing the Atom. He is a PhD Candidate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a member of the Security Studies Program.Mahsa Rouhiis a joint research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs International Security Program and Project on Managing the Atom.
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