20 Apr 2024
Thursday 6 October 2016 - 16:12
Story Code : 234273

Iran-Russia relations post nuclear deal

In April 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was struck that allowed Iran to pursue its nuclear program for peaceful purpose. Irans centrifuge and heavy water reactor program has been restricted so that it can only be used for peaceful programs and not for producing nuclear weapons. While one country, China has already sought to occupy a prominent position in Irans nuclear market, Russia, another ally of Iran is also aiming to gain its share in the nuclear energy market. During the nuclear negotiation process, Russia had also identified the right of the Iran to pursue peaceful use of nuclear program under the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of which Iran is a signatory to.

Russia has also sought to advance its nuclear cooperation with Iran as well as its defense cooperation with Iran, evidence to which is the agreed sale of S-300 sophisticated air defense system to Iran. In April, 2016, Russia provided the parts of the S-300 system to Tehran. As I have argued earlier, that Iran has a budget of US$ 40 billion for modernising its army and hence, Russia could find this market lucrative. This strengthening of relations has come about due to a growing convergence in interests over the crisis in Syria. However, there is another growing convergence of interests, and that is, both Russia and Irans growing interest to check ISIS which has also resulted in Iran and Russia joining hands with some factions of the Taliban. Right after the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) signed in 2013, in 2014, Moscow agreed to build eight nuclear power reactors in Iran. According to the nuclear deal, Russia is supposed to provide nuclear fuel for the Iranian nuclear power plants and the spent fuel would be returned to Russia for processing and storage as a step to curtail Irans capability to develop nuclear weapons. In 2016, Russian President Vladmir Putin expressed his interest to enhance nuclear cooperation with Iran that would include cooperating on a uranium enrichment program and producing stable isotopes that he believes would reduce tensions surrounding the Iranian nuclear program and also bolster strategic ties between the two countries. As Iranian speaker of the Majlis (the parliament), Ali Larijani, states Iran is an energy power, which has sources of energy, with a large number of specialists and prospects of growth and that it is simple to invest in Iran considering that the energy sector and human resources are already available. That is why Russia would find it easier to invest in Irans infrastructure facilities as Iran also favors Russia to do so out ofstrategic choice.

There are also plans to boost trade relations between Iran and Russia which in 2016 has increased to 70 percent bringing it to $855million by May 2016. In August 2016, President Putin has also expressed his interest to establish a free trade zone between Iran and Russian led Eurasian Economic Union.

In December 2015, there were reports that Russia had signed a contract with Iran to build two more reactors at the Bushehr power plant in southern Iran. Not only this, Russia also offered in December 2015, a state credit of $5 billion to Iran in 2016. In May 2016, a business forum was organized to discuss prospects of further trade cooperation between the two countries. In July 2016, Russian Energy Minister, Alexander Novak will invest in Irans oil and gas projects, making them major fields of cooperation between Tehran and Moscow. In August 2016, Moscow has also supported Irans desire to become a full-fledged member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

However, this relationship is not as smooth as it appears to be and there is divergence in the ways both Russia and Iran deal with the crisis in Syria, though in August 2016, Russia had used the air-base near Hamedan in western Iran to launch air strikes on Syrian rebels to support the Syrian Army and Assad regime. For Iran, strengthening the Assad regime gives it the leverage to continue support to Hezbollah to contain the Israelis. For Russia on the other hand, defeat of the Assad regime would mean growing influence of the United States in the region as also a fragmented Syria that would only give rise to asymmetric organizations that could threaten Russias security like the case with ISIS.

Moreover, post the failed coup attempt in Turkey, Turkeys relations with Russia areslowly cooling down. During the G-20 Summit, the two countries met and discussed and exchanged opinions on the the Syrian crisis very candidly. They also discussed the possibility of lifting Russian ban on Turkish food items as a part of their rapprochement process. This growing relationship may not be viewed by Iran in positive light as Turkey and Iran both are vying to become regional powers in Middle East. For Turkey, Russia seems to be its new friend especially amid growing bitter relations with its NATO ally, the United States. For Russia, having Turkey by its side proves conducive as it would mean an ally of the United States now building stronger ties with Russia. Turkey on the other hand has no faith in the European Union, as evident from the Turkish President Racep Erdogans statement, The EU plays with us for 53 years. We consistently have been proving our honesty and expect the same from the EU. It should abandon the policy of double standards. Therefore, Turkey may view Russia as a strong partner to enter other economic forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

However, as mentioned, Turkey is a NATO member, a Washington-led military organization and a staunch rival of Russia. Therefore, Russia too would be calculative in its approach towards Turkey and would not want to annoy Iran, which shares the same bitterness towards the United States and is also not a NATO member.

 
This article was written by Debalina Ghoshal for Forbes on Oct 05, 2016. Ms. Ghoshal is an an independent consultant specializing in issues on nuclear, missile and missile defense and on strategic affairs.




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