One year has passed since a joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached in Vienna between Iran and permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (the P5) plus Germany. During a one-year period many attempts have been made to complete this diplomatic process.

At the same time, Ali Akbar Velayati's harsh criticism (a member of JCPOA supervision committee) yesterday, accusing U.S. of breaching Nuke Deal and also 5+1 silence, indicates that this process is not only incomplete but also faces serious threats. In this case, emphasizing that we do not wait for the violation or failure of the nuclear deal and we do not consider it as a desirable scenario, it is the time that we review some issues once again.

1- What is the American's perception of sanctions?

Recently an important symposium was held in the Atlantic Council with regard to this subject, "Can the U.S work with Iran: challenges and opportunities". John E. Smith, acting director of the U.S. Department of the Treasury�s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) was one of the special features in this meeting. When William Luers, director of the Iran project, invited John Smith, he said: "Is there someone at the meeting who does not know OFAC? Perhaps

It seems that American political logic, or what they consider it as the necessity of spreading American value to stabilize a liberal world order, is a logic based on sanctions against Iran. Thus simplifying the sanction issues never help us.

OFAC is one the most powerful government agencies in the U.S." The U.S. Department of the Treasury�s Office of Foreign Assets Control dates to the war of 1812 between Great Britain and the U.S. The first U.S. economic sanctions administered sanctions against Great Britain.

In other words, Americans use the sanctions tools for more than two centuries. In the meantime, regarding different types of sanctions a question then arises as, "Have Americans decided to use sanctions based on economic or political logic?" In other words, while sanctions against Iran, Russia, and etc., decreases daily the value of the dollar as an international exchange currency, it seems that American political logic, or what they consider it as the necessity of spreading American value to stabilize a liberal world order, is a logic based on sanctions against Iran. Thus simplifying the sanction issues never help us.

Basically issues simplification in politics means closing your eyes to some parts of reality. In the specific cases of sanctions, the cancellation of sanctions systematically is a part of a mature seven-phase cycle of sanction. Accepting the fact that the lifting of sanctions, which itself is part of a cycle of sanction, does not mean that at least in theory we consider structural failure of sanctions impossible. However, it means that lifting sanctions should not be considered as a breach in the structure of sanctions. Now a question arises here that JCPOA leads to a lifting sanctions as a ring of chained sanctions or basically has caused a damage to the structure of American sanctions?

2) What does OFAC do about JCPOA?

After the talks between the foreign ministers of Iran and foreign ministers of 5 permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany, in the U.S. some parts of the JCPOA implementation has been outside the scope of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has come to the scope of U.S. Department of the Treasury. When Implementation Day arrived, on January 16th, 2016, OFAC released a general license called the General License H signed by Mr. John Smith. The General License was adjusted based on America's obligation about the comprehensive joint action

In short, OFAC, on behalf of the U.S. Government, moves on the edge of JCPOA violation. On the one hand OFAC cannot be accused of gross violation of JCPOA and on the other hand it prevents Iran economic growth and productivity.

plan, but in practice because of the three reasons it had no efficiency. First, the license has many ambiguities. At the recent meeting of the Atlantic Council, John Smith mentioned that to date he has to publish a license for 3 pages and also 44 pages of legal description to clarify the ambiguities. Second, OFAC is basically is an office to declare the limitations and does not accept any responsibility to describe JCPOA capacities.

Third, in addition to OFAC, the U.S officials changed their tone, including Secretary of State John Kerry in a meeting in London on May 12 and Deputy Lead Coordinator for Iran Nuclear Implementation Jarret Blanc in Zurich on 4 May, has not only eliminated anxieties about banks, financial institutions and business interested cooperating with Iran, but in practice they spread more doubts.

A day after John Kerry meeting, HSBC international bank reacted to his comments and declared that on the basis of these positions they are not willing to engage with Iran. As a reaction OFAC on 8 June published a new official note as "frequently asked questions relating to lifting of certain US sanctions under the JCPOA" which includes answers to the two questions in connection with banking relationships and financial institutions (c.15 & c. 16) and nine additional questions about U.S.-owned or �controlled foreign entities.

Such a descriptions, on the one hand, have been useful to remove uncertainties about the financial and economic dealings with Iran, and the other hand they have been insufficient to create a serious impetus for the revival of these interactions. In short, OFAC, on behalf of the U.S. Government, moves on the edge of JCPOA violation. On the one hand OFAC cannot be accused of gross violation of JCPOA and on the other hand it prevents Iran economic growth and productivity.

3) What happened if the U.S. violates the agreement?

While some people in Iran believe that the current government in America in a destructive approach is trying to prevent the JCPOA economic efficiency, there is no doubt that the next government in America does the same and tries to weaken more JCPOA; no matter Clinton

While some people in Iran believe that the current government in America in a destructive approach is trying to prevent the JCPOA economic efficiency, there is no doubt that the next government in America does the same and tries to weaken more JCPOA; no matter Clinton or Trump take the power.

or Trump take the power. So the question about the future of Iran's political and economic interactions (a question beyond the future of JCPOA) depends more to the decisions and behaviors of European countries than Americans.� To clarify this matter we should mention to different approaches European countries has applied sanctions period under the Obama and Bill Clinton administrations.

Under Clinton administration, other countries refused a consensus on implementing Senator Alphonse D'Amato sanction law. The Iran-Libya Sanction Act (ILSA) is another example that was a major defeat for U.S. foreign policy. In other words, in Iran we should be able now to estimate the European's behavior whether they remain united in the forty-fifth president of the U.S. or logically they do not follow the U.S sanctions which is a coercive instrument of punishment. European behavior can be an indicator of a response to the question raised at the beginning of this note. Whether Americans persuaded Iran to change its behavior or they have to change their behavior?

Although it is almost impossible to predict but partial results could be achieved through an analysis of some events. Mahan Air like some other Iranian companies remains subject to sanctions and the company's name is still on the list of SDN and U.S. primary sanctions (in connection with Iran activities and policies in the region). According to Mahan Air and Charles de Gaulle Airport confirmation, the Mahan Air direct flights to Paris were resumed. Without any doubt we should notice that the Charles de Gaulle Airport and other airline suppliers companies in the airport that have contracted with Mahan to resume flights to Paris, fully aware that Mahan Air is under sanction.

At the same time, this small token has some items to breach and in particular what Ali Akbar Velayati interpreted it as a 5+1 silence, are some of these examples. So the answer to the question about the future of JCPOA and the question of the structures of the sanction framework against Iran should be detected neither in Iran or America, but in the third side of this agreement and the behaviors of other international actors. This behavior is not yet fully formed. If incentive policies became operational in Europe for trade with Iran, so we can see a future for JCPOA. Otherwise a serious concern will rise again and will restart lose-lose game.

This article was written by Seyyed Mohammad Eslami for Khorasan News on July 13, 2016. Seyyed Mohammad Eslami is editor-in-chief of "Khorasan Diplomatic" Mag.Book. and has been covering the nuclear talks from a close-up percpective.�He is also Columnist at Khorasan Newspaper and�research fellow in MENA studies at Mofid University.�