Many reasons justify that lack of confidence Iranians have in America: Some of these reasons include its support of the [August 15] 1953 coup, not to mention its undying support of the Shah; its support of Iraq under Saddam Hussein�s regime, and Iraq�s use of chemical weapons (which the American administration knew of) against troops and civilians; its attack of an Iranian passenger plane, Iran Air Flight 655, which killed 290 civilians; and of course, its labeling as part of the Axis of Evil by the George W. Bush administration.

By studying the contemporary history of Iran, you find three important historical events, all brought together by one common factor: the challenge that is to trust a country like the U.S.

Addressing these issues which refer the events of the years 1950 -1952, 1990, and 2003-2005, shows us how this trust can be fragile. Talking about the reasons of this distrust may help us establish a sound deal with such an untrustworthy country in our new relations, mainly with regards to our nuclear issue.

Thus this essay aims to present a historical glance of Iran � U.S relations from their beginning to the present.

How did America play dual role in Iran�s Nationalization of the oil industry?

After the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (Enghel?b-e Mashr?teh) of 1905-1911, the nationalization of Iran�s oil industry was one of the most important demands voiced by popular movements in Iran. This demand would later bear fruit under the Mosaddegh administration in the early 1950s, and thus a study of the policy led by this administration is very important. He was one of those who proposed the �negative balance� theory [1]. According to this theory, Iran would not endow Russia or Britain any special privileges, nor would it allow them to have a monopoly in industry, or lean towards them. This is due to the fact that these two foreign superpowers had competed over Iran in the past, and have repeatedly damaged Iranian interests.

Mosaddegh, one of the theory�s many proponents, would add another article to it, would point out that the existence of a third foreign power like the USA, which did not have any colonial background in Iran, will be moderated the position of two above competitors.

US attitude toward Iran in the Mosaddegh era

Although the economic importance of the Middle East to the US outweighed its political important, but the US chose to secure the former by using the latter: The fear of communist influence in the region. For instance, since the British economy was heavily damaged in World War II and as such was not willing to reduce its own share in Middle East oil, Washington would wiggle the �communist� scarecrow to convince Britain to increase its share in the region�s oil production (especially Iraq and Iran who were under British control).

The U.S�s support in the early stages of the nationalization of Iran�s oil industry �though given reluctantly- was aimed at decreasing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company�s influence, while simultaneously preparing for the entrance of American oil companies into the field. To state things more clearly, the US was looking to substitute Britain�s influence with its own. Mosaddegh perceived the US�s opposition to the influence of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company as a sign of Washington�s support of the nationalization of Iran�s oil industry, but he was mistaken as history would later prove.

Short-term pros and cons

In the process of Iran�s Nationalization of its oil industry, the US played a dual role, sometimes supporting Mosaddegh, and sometimes Britain. Eventually the US and Britain would work together as Mosaddegh government was overthrown by a coup d��tat . The US had even planned for the contingency where the coup d��tat would fail, preparing to use militias from the south to bring about further destabilization if it should come to it.

Hereat we can first ask why the US would deal with Mosaddegh in such a manner? And second, why would Mosaddegh trust the US despite indications that the US was prepared to use employ hostile measures against his government.

To answer the first question is simple. The US was after its interests and clearly oil was its first priority. The nationalization movement was in the favor of US, because this would increase its share of Iran�s oil industries. But as Truman wrote in his memoirs, the threat posed by the nationalization of Iranian Oil would be in the blowback this would cause in countries whose oil the US holds large shares in, such as in Latin America, its own backyard.
As for the question of Mosaddegh�s trust of the US. It seemed that Mosaddegh had no definite perception of Iran�s position and its role in US foreign policy. He thought that the US was actually ready to end its coalition with Britain in favor of a share Iran�s oil, while the US was planning on getting both. Eisenhower, during whose administration the 1953 coup took place: �The aim of the US was to initiate American companies and institutions in an international oil consortium and that was achieved by overthrew of Mosaddegh government.�

Freeing Iran/US Hostages in Lebanon

After Imam Khomeini�s demise, George Bush, who wanted the U.S to be influential in Iran again, wanted to reestablish the US-Iran ties. In this context, he -who was trying to release American hostages in Lebanon- issued a statement in which he would utter his famous sentence: Good will begets good will.

The US then attacked Iraq which had invaded Kuwait. The Zionist Regime seized hundreds of Lebanese and 19 Iranians. Moreover, Four Iranian diplomats were captured by the Lebanese Phalanges [2] which were under the control of Zionist regime. Hezbollah and other Lebanese groups replied by taking some Americans hostage. At the time, the Iran-Iraq war had ended and Iran had been trying to get the international community to blame Iraq as the aggressor. As such, the Iranians would reply to George Bush in an indirect manner, emphasizing Iran�s readiness to cooperate with any countries wishing to hold talks.

The UN was thus was chosen to mediate deal. Giandomenico Picco, then advisor to the UN Secretary General, came to Iran and negotiated with Iranian authorities. Contrary to the McFarlane issue, this time, both sides emphasized on the importance of the negotiations. Picco, who represented the US, called for release of the American hostages and the Iranian side demanded that Iraq be determined as the aggressor, which as a result would have bear the burden of the inflicted losses and damages of this war and also for the release of Iranian and Lebanese hostages and prisoners held by the Zionist Regime and the Phalanges.

In response to George Bush�s �Good will begets good will�, the American hostages were released. In the aftermath, the Special representative of the United Nations in Tehran informed Iranian officials that the US will not fulfill its commitments. Later still the US designated Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism. To add insult to injury, US officials awarded the Legion of Merit to the captain of the USS Vincennes cruiser that shot down Iran Air Flight 655, killing 290 civilians.

Nuclear talks

After Iran�s nuclear energy program was revealed, this would become the most important case for both Iran in terms of foreign policy, and for the IAEA�s board of governors.

At first, Iran�s government and the First team of negotiators were of the opinion that the secrecy of their nuclear program nurtured mistrust between them and the West and decided to adopt confidence-building measures. Therefore, the then administration of Iran, before beginning of the first round of talks with the UK, France and Germany (with the US monitoring things from a distance) announced that Iran is prepared to accept Additional Protocol in the interest of increased confidence. The first round of talks was held in Tehran, Iran with the aim of preventing the adoption of any resolution against this country in the IAEA, and to prevent Iran�s case from going to the Security Council. However the true goal of the Western negotiators was the suspension of the entire nuclear program.

The voluntary suspension of nuclear activities by Iran and the signing of the Additional Protocol were the result of these negotiations, known as the Tehran Declaration (or Saadabad Agreement). Meanwhile, the side representing the West agreed to use its veto power if Iran�s case is referred to the Security Council. Furthermore, in accordance with this agreement, the three counties recognized Iran�s right to the harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. A few months later in the talks held in Brussels, this voluntary suspension would later spread to other nuclear related activities in Iran. In return, the west sought to normalize Iran�s case in IAEA Board of Governors.

Iran in its Strategic confrontation with US always should always keep in mind the US�s unchanging comportment towards it during the past decades. As such Iranians should not assume that a change of administration in the White House will reflect change towards their government. Although the Democrats and the Republicans in the US do not share the same opinions, they do have an unchanging feature. Regardless of which one of the two reigns, they have always dealt with Iran in dishonesty and did not stay true to their word. Just as in the three periods outlined in the article, although Iran proved its full compliance with IAEA obligations, the US and its allies remained undeterred in being untruthful negotiators. Consequently, perhaps it would be better if we revise George Bush Sr.�s famous speech and say: Goodwill does not always beget goodwill.

This article was written by Ali Hassan Heidari for American Herald Tribune on Apr. 9, 2016. Ali Hassan Heidari is an independent journalist and expert in South West Asia.