29 Mar 2024
Wednesday 20 January 2016 - 22:16
Story Code : 197850

Squeezed out of Syria, Daesh's next target could be the house of Saud

With Daesh's self-proclaimed Islamic caliphate slowly crumbling under the pressure of attacks from all sides in Syria and Iraq, the terrorist group may eventually call it quits in Mesopotamia and the Levant and move on to attack the Saudi monarchy, warns geopolitical analyst Schuyler Moore.


In her analysis, originally published byinternational affairs journal The Bridge, Moore, a Washington-based defense analyst, notes that asthe international anti-Daesh (ISIL/ISIS) war effort ramps up, the self-proclaimed caliphate's decline is inevitable. "Its decline may take years or even decades, butit will ultimately decline."

"But although ISIS may deplete its resources and feel increasing pressure fromthe international community, its members will not simply disappear asthe group loses momentum," the analyst warns.

The terrorist organization, Moore recalls, "is largely comprised offoreign fighters withlimited ties tothe countries they fight in, and inthe event ofa relocation, one country inparticular looks likea promising alternative Saudi Arabia."
"With internal unrest, the threat ofoil-driven economic instability and a history ofconflict withits neighbors, the House ofSaud is ripe forinsurgency and would be the ideal next location forjihadists looking fora new rallying point." Thus, "as ISIS loses steam and is pushed outof its old stomping grounds, Saudi Arabia is indanger ofbecoming the next ground zero forterrorism inthe region."


Moore breaks downher analysis intothree parts. These include 'internal risk factors', the Kingdom's 'history ofradical Islamist insurgency', and 'external pressure'.

Domestic Pressures

Internally, the analyst writes, Saudi Arabia faces "unique demographic and socio-economic challenges" including an immigrant community which makes upnearly a third ofthe country's population of28 million and overthree-quarters ofthe labor force. Moreover, about70% ofthe population is under30, withnearly 30% ofthe country's youth unemployed.

"Nationals and non-nationals alike live underSharia law withstrict Wahhabi principles dictated bythe royal family and the religious leaders ofthe ulmea [Saudi religious scholars], which often cause[s] strains withinthe immigrant population aswell asthe native population."
Meanwhile, ultra-conservative religious leaders' resistance tocalls forthe Kingdom's reform and modernization, together withuncertainties caused bythe hidden nature ofintra-royal family politics, causes friction and adds layers ofuncertainty which, Moore suggests, "open[s] the door forterrorist groups who might take advantage ofthe instability."


The collapse ofglobal oil prices only adds fuel tothe fire ofinternal instability, the analyst notes. "With 80% ofits budget revenues coming fromoil production, Saudi Arabia has been massively affected bydropping oil prices, running some ofits highest deficits inhistory."

Traditionally dependent upon "its constant influx ofoil wealth tosupply high-paying government jobs tokey supporterswith the rapidly dropping oil prices, Saudi Arabia may lose its ability tomaintain popularity throughemployment opportunities."
Ultimately, Moore notes, the oil crisis is butanother factor in "a growing list ofuncertainties plaguing the country," uncertainties which "not only encourage terrorist organizations toview Saudi Arabia asprime real estate, butalso create an environment inwhich the young, unemployed Saudi citizens themselves might fuel the fire ofinsurgency."


A History of (Islamist) Violence

Looking back atthe history ofIslamist insurgency againstthe House ofSaud and its allies, the analyst recalls that inmodern times, this history goes back to1990, when Riyadh allowed the US tostation permanent military bases onSaudi territory.

Since then, the Kingdom "has faced an increasingly radical conservative Wahhabi faction that has objected toany sort offriendly relations withthe Western worldThat radical base has been responsible forthe majority ofterrorist attacks withinthe kingdom."

Moreover, recalling Riyadh's strategy ofactively encouraging "youth togo abroad tosupport its Muslim brothers, whether inIraq, Afghanistan or Chechnya," Moore notes that "the Saudi government has seen this strategy backfire when Saudi fighters returned home and conducted attacks athome using the skills they acquired while fighting abroad."
Unfortunately, she suggests, Saudi Arabia's counterterrorism measures, including the policy making fighting abroad a crime, "maybe be too little too late."


"Saudi Arabia is currently one ofthe largest sources offoreign fighters inIraq and Syria, withupwards of2,000 Saudi nationals joining ISIS, and is home tothe largest number ofpro-ISIS Twitter users inthe world. The recent crack-down onforeign fighters is likely a response tofears that these jihadists will similarly return home and bring the fight toSaudi Arabia's doorstep, ashas happened inthe past, and an implicit recognition that Saudi Arabia may very well become the new hub forterrorism."

Foreign Policy Boomerang Effect

In addition tointernal pressures, Moore points outthat the threat ofterrorism againstthe Kingdom has grown asa result ofits disastrous foreign policy.

"Saudi Arabia's involvement inYemen is steadily draining resources and political good will. The Iranian nuclear deal was perceived asa loss and a sign ofweakness forSaudi Arabia and the Sunni community, which has always fought tocontain its Shia neighbor. ISIS has already targeted Saudi Arabia forits ties tothe United States, and inresponse the government has been driven toarrest almost one hundred people in2015 alone forsuspected ties to [the terrorist group]."

In the final analysis, Moore warns, domestic instability and discontent, falling oil prices, the Kingdom's ties tothe West (which provokes outrage amongradicals), and a government stretching itself thin viafutile adventurism inYemen and Syria, threatens tomake Saudi Arabia an ideal Daesh target.
By Sputnik
https://theiranproject.com/vdcjiaevyuqehoz.92fu.html
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