Tehran, December 31, The Iran Project – Along with Iran’s military forces’ increasing approach for proximity to Russia, foreign ministry’s policy makers reveal the intentions to bolster ties with the Western countries.
Through flurry of military collaborations, IRGC and Iran’s Army Forces signal the importance they attach to the “Look East” policy. The later attitude which is seemingly backed by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei has been strengthen through the recent intimate meeting between Russia’s President Putin and Iran’s leader before the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) in the capital Tehran in late November.
Iranian pro-Western elements in Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs have realized that a policy of improving relations with the West is essential to engage in international community.
Resolving the differences through the nuclear deal struck in July 14th and the latest closure of Iran’s PMD (Possible Military Dimensions of Iran’s nuclear case) are levers they mainly apply to evidence that their diplomatic approach so far have proved fruitful for the country.
Meanwhile, both Russian and the Western sides seek various incentives to ensure Iran’s attachment to their own blocs.
Russia has increasingly opened the door of economic trades with Iran, reducing the tariff for importing products from Iran. The country’s decision to build two new nuclear power plants in southern Iranian port city of Bushehr and enhancing the supply of conventional arms are the other particular concessions that Russia has granted Iran.
Along with removing sanctions and efforts to settle remnants of Iran’ nuclear case with IAEA, as part of what they have previously pledged, the West keeps an eye on distinctive incentives which once have had been a dream to Iran. One of these concessions which now seems more attainable to Iran is wining the non-permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council.
The formation of a same united bloc against terrorism, the joint investment projects in Iran and the immediate removal of sanctions are other levers to persuade it to resume proximity with Western side. The attempts to create atmosphere of collaboration, however, may be hindered as the result of Israeli lobbies and Saudi officials’ anxiety that has been triggered particularly after the nuclear agreement in July.
Such efforts also may be thwarted due to the fact that the U.S. congress has moved to toughen measures which not only block the efforts to convince Iran but also contravene the historic agreement in last July.
The new Congress law bars citizens of 38 countries mainly in Europe from using the US visa-free system if they traveled to Iran, Iraq and Sudan during the past five years. In addition, the US lawmakers passed a law that the Americans who held hostage at the US embassy in Iran receive financial compensation up to $10,000 for each day of captivity.
Thus, the path forward for West’s rapprochement with Iran seems blurry and not quite promising since Iran sees the changes in Visa Waiver Program a decision adopted by the US political system, as a single monolithic block.
Finally, the history of Iran’s foreign relations with great powers makes clear that it never trusts neither of the sides, following the path abided by its own national interests, even if it had already been seduced by tempting incentives like wining the US Security Council non-permanent membership.