Im pleased to host another guest post by friend of ACL Dr. Yousaf Butt. Yousafs research and writing is always provocative, in the best sense, and I think provides important analysis and critique that you hear from few other voices. I especially appreciate Yousafs technical expertise, which few have and which is extremely useful as we lawyers try to understand and work in this highly technical issue area.Dr.YousafButt, a nuclear physicist, is Director of the Emerging Technologies Program atthe Cultural Intelligence Institute, a non-profit organization dedicated to promoting fact-based cultural awareness among individuals, institutions, and governments. The views expressed here are his own.
One of the sticking points in the on-going Iran nuclear negotiations is the fate of the so-calledPossible Military Dimensions(aka Alleged Studies) file. This is a compendium ofallegationsagainst Irans nuclear program largely gathered by third-party intelligence agencies that the IAEA would like Iran to respond to. Not only are the allegations largelyoutside the IAEA legal authority and expertise(because they do not directly deal with nuclear material diversion), but Iran has not been allowed to see much of thissecretevidence that is being used against it. Such a process is, of course, not consistent with normal Western legal practice. Iran has responded to what little it has been shown of the PMD file by saying that the evidence thus far shown is fabricated.
Though this Iranian response is often cast as Iran not cooperating with the IAEA (or refusing to discuss the matter), another possibility must be considered: that Iran is correct. That is, that at least some the evidence has indeed been cooked-up by an adversarial Intelligence service (or by an agent recruited by such an Intelligence service).
A wonderful new book by Gudrun Harrer on the IAEA inspections in Iraq sheds some light on which countries could be involved in fabricating and planting such fake nuclear evidence. On p. 185 ofthe book, it is confirmed that Israel provided the IAEA with false information on Laser Isotope Separation activities in Iraq. The reference for this information is the authors interview with David Albright of ISIS (see at this insert the relevant scanned pages from the book):
Harrer on Albright Israel
Israel has, of course,long been suspectedof being behind some of theforged and suspect evidence against Iran: the neutron initiators,AP graphs, etc., but until now it was hard to definitely pin the blame on that country. Thanks to David Albright at ISIS, we now know that Israel has been guilty of planting disinformation with the IAEA in the past.
The German intelligence agency has alsodiscredited much of the secret evidenceagainst Iran.
Having myselfanalyzed some of what is (evidently) in this PMD file with Dr. Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies I can say that the evidence is certainly of poor quality and/or an amateurish forgery. It does not look like anything a state-level research scientist would produce. There are large and conspicuous mathematical and physical errors in the material.
Similarly, Robert Kelley has assessed that at least some ofthe evidence purporting to show weaponization research work continuing past 2004 is less than compelling:
[The] evidence, according to the IAEA, tells us Iran embarked on a four-year program, starting around 2006, to validate the design of a device to produce a burst of neutrons that could initiate a fission chain reaction. Though I cannot say for sure what source the agency is relying on, I can say for certain that this project was earlier at the center of what appeared to be a misinformation campaign. Mohamed ElBaradei, who was then the agencys director general, rejected the information because there was no chain of custody for the paper, no clear source, document markings, date of issue or anything else that could establish its authenticity
David Albrights confirmation of Israeli nuclear disinformation goes hand-in-glove with statements from former IAEA director, and Nobel Prize winner, Mohammed ElBaradei. In his biography, ElBaradei says that the documents that the IAEA had about the alleged neutron initiators in Iran circa 2008 were given to the Agency by Israel. He further states that Israel gave him permission to show the evidence to Iran.
So the question is, why has the IAEA not cooperated with Iran in evaluating material like they did with Iraq circa 1995, in the incident mentioned by Harrer?
Iran could be genuinely helpful if they were allowed to see the original evidence and comment on it. When the IAEA workedwithIraq to evaluate documents, the Iraqis helpfully pointed out mistakes that the IAEA could independently confirm. Isnt that the example we would like to see with Iran?
Being charged with secret evidence also goes against every notion of Western justice. The IAEA either needs to drop the PMD file, or amend their procedures.
Unfortunately, it is quite likely that the Israeli government is once again carrying out nuclear disinformation,possibly in collaboration with the MEK, an Iranian terrorist in some nations,formerlyterrorist organizationopposed to the current Iranian regime.
Over the past weekend, it was also confirmed thatIsrael masterminded the assassinations of Iraniannuclear scientists. These assassinations, too, perhaps werecarried out with local MEK collaboration. If the Israeli government is capable of assassinating civilian Iranian scientists, would fabricating nuclear intel on Iran trouble their consciences? Presumably not. Especially as they have done it in the past, according to David Albright at ISIS.
Before further pursuing Iran on the PMD file which maycontain substantial forged evidence it would make sense to ask Israel to come clean about any fabricated intelligence it may have planted with the IAEA. It is quite possible that some of the PMD file is not fake. Israels assistance and cooperation in identifying what is fake and what is not would be most helpful. If David Albright of ISIS has further insight into this as he did in the Iraqi case his involvement would also, of course, be very welcome.
It is becoming increasingly difficult to give credibility to hyperbolic Israeli statements about Irans underhandedness in pursuing its nuclear program, when Israel itself has been underhanded in pursuing clandestine disinformation campaigns against NPT states, while itself remaining resolutely outside the NPT.
There are several points for the IAEA to consider in light of these recent developments:
1. Should the IAEA reject all evidence from Israel against Iran and other adversarial states now?
2. Should the IAEA, generally, not accept intelligence from non-NPT states?
3. The IAEA should show Iran any evidence it wants an Iranian response on. Anything less is not consistent with Western notions of justice. Furthermore such cooperation could unveil the origin of any possible forgeries in the PMD file.
4. The IAEA and the US should ask Israel to come clean on any fabricated evidence it may have inserted into the PMD file.
5. AsI have suggested previously, it would be bestto simply drop the PMD file as it relates to decade old unauthenticated allegations of possible research. It is not even clear that what is in the PMD file even if true would be a violation of the NPT or the safeguards agreement.
6. If the IAEA really wants to pursue the content of the PMD in a legal way they can initiatespecial inspectionsor undertakearbitration as provided forin the CSA. The IAEA does not even have the technical expertise in-house to undertake investigations of missiles, warheads etc. which are mentioned in the PMD file.
7. Since Iran is now incompliance with its safeguards agreement, Irans nuclear file currentlyhung-up in the Security Council should return to the IAEA. The referral to the Security Council wasunorthodox and politicizedto begin with, and there is no rationale for Irans nuclear file toremain there post-2008. (Footnote 38 of the latest IAEA report on Iran makes clear that the remaining issues are not IAEA safeguards issues but extraneous UNSC ones).
8. This also means that the UNSC nuclear-related sanctions on Iran should now be dropped. In fact, theyought to have been dropped in 2008.
David Albright must be commended for his helpful insight into fabricated Israeli intelligence in Iraq, and hopefully can assist in tracking down similar disinformation in the case of Iran.
Relatedly, we must thank him and ISIS also for showing the international community expensive satellitepictures of Parchin, in which one can see that west of the paving activity, the site is untouched, and so the IAEA could get environmental samples there (if they even needed those). This undercuts ISIS own conclusion that the site has been magically sanitized by paving. Normally, of course, the IAEA would take such swipe samples fromwithin the buildingswhere any suspect U naturally collects: in the corners and at the places where the walls meet the floor.
The technical weaknesses in ISIS and IAEAs approach toParchin were previously commented on.
The IAEAstechnically unsound obsession with environmental sampling at Parchinmay also mean they are confusing the site at Marivan (where open-air implosion tests may have taken place) with thesite at Parchin(where implosions in a chamber are alleged).
From the May 2008 Board report, referring to the Marivan site:
A.2. High Explosives Testing
[..........]
Document 3: Five page document in English describing experimentation undertaken with a complex multipoint initiation system to detonate a substantial amount of high explosive in hemispherical geometry and to monitor the development of the detonation wave in that high explosive using a considerable number of diagnostic probes.
And the alleged weapons studies annex Nov 2011:
43. Information provided to the Agency by the same Member State referred to in the previous paragraph describes the multipoint initiation concept referred to above as being used by Iran in at least one large scale experiment in 2003 to initiate a high explosive charge in the form of a hemispherical shell. [...] Further information provided to the Agency by thesame Member State indicates that the large scale high explosive experiments were conducted by Iran in the region of Marivan.
So what is the point of carrying out environmental sampling at Parchin (where chamber experiments are alleged) and not at Marivan where open-air experiments were allegedly done? Is the IAEA and ISIS confused between Marivan and Parchin?
TheIAEAs unprofessionalism in vetting the content of the PMD file, and in the obsession over Parchin(which the IAEA visited twice already) vs. Marivan smacks of an agenda to target Iran rather than any sound technical analysis.It is likely to blow up the Iran nuclear deal for no good reason. Iran has cooperated with the IAEA on the PMD file by saying that the material it was shown was fabricated this may be true. Now Israel should also cooperate and come clean about what forged material or material fromcompromised sources like Curveball may be within this file. David Albright, with his past knowledge and evident expertise in fabricated Israeli intelligence should also step up to the plate.
And, certainly, Iran should be shown any evidence it is being asked to answer to by the IAEA. The Agency should also spend about half an hour and check whether the site it is interested in for environmental sampling is Marivan or Parchin.Environmental sampling at Parchin makes little sense. At Parchin, swipes would be taken fromwithinthe buildings since chamber-based implosions are alleged. While it is at it, the IAEA should also review thetechnical basis of their conclusions on Syria.
It is hard to take the Agency seriously when it persists in being blatantly unprofessional.
Dr Jim Walsh, a research associate at MIT, hasan excellent suggestionabout what to do with Irans PMD file as paraphrased by Mark Hibbs: If the nuclear activities were in the past, I dont care. Its dead, and its regretful, but lets do a deal with Iran that moves forward.
But before we do that, the IAEA should ask Israel to come clean about its potential role in fabricating some of the evidence within the PMD file.
Given itshistorical misuse, the IAEA should also re-visit whether it will continue to acceptintelligence from third-parties,especially non-NPT member states.
By Arms Control Law
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