No one really believed that thelatest round ofinternational negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program would produce abreakthrough. So it was no surprise that it did not, despite theconcessions that were made atthe meeting inKazakhstan bythe P5+1 (China, France, Russia, theUnited Kingdom andthe United States, plus Germany). Washington's belief that aharsh sanctions regime could coax Iran intoa deal has proved tobe unrealistic.Despite being isolated andostracized, Iran has managed togain some strategic breathing room with thehelp ofcountries like China, Russia, India, Syria andVenezuela, allowing it toresist Western pressure. More important, even though thesevere sanctions regime led bythe U.S. is bound tobe imperfect, it only hardens further Iran's resistance.
Tobe sure, Iran's alliances are vulnerable toerosion, andin thecase oftwo staunch allies, Syria andVenezuela, tooutright collapse. Even so, Russia andChina continue totake amuch more lenient approach toIran andits pursuit togain thecapability toproduce nuclear weapons. While theWestern powers have embraced ever-harsher sanctions, Russia andChina view Iran as atool intheir global competition with theU.S.
China's Iranian interests boil down toeconomics. Bilateral trade stands atabout $40 billion ayear. China is not only Iran's largest customer forcrude oil, but also acolossal investor somewhere between $40 billion and$100 billion inIran's energy andtransportation sectors. True, China cannot entirely overlook U.S. pressure andthe staunch opposition ofits top oil supplier, Saudi Arabia, toIran's nuclear program. But, while China has supported themandatory sanctions set bythe United Nations Security Council, it has rejected theWest's unilateral measures.
With bilateral trade worth only about $5 billion annually, Russia's economic interests inIran are fairly modest. But it fears Iran's ability tocause trouble, particularly bystirring up unrest among Russia's Muslim citizens. Moreover, theU.S. has refused topay theKremlin's high price curtailment ofcongressional human rights legislation andabandonment ofplans forballistic missile defense inEurope forRussian support onIran.
Theproblem with theU.S. drive tohave key stakeholders join its anti-Iran crusade is that some ofthem live inneighborhoods where Iran is animportant factor India, forexample. India is certainly alarmed atthe possibility ofIran developing nuclear weapons, not tomention thepossible effects ofIran's Islamist fundamentalism onKashmiri Muslims. But India's $14 billion inannual bilateral trade, andits dependence onIranian oil are key strategic considerations.
Moreover, India needs Iran as analternative trade andenergy conduit toCentral Asia, bypassing rival Pakistan, andalso as ahedge against anuncertain future inAfghanistan after theU.S. withdraws in2014. As aresult, India's policy mirrors China's: It has aligned itself with mandatory international sanctions but has abjured voluntary Western financial restrictions.
Theequivocal nature ofIran's alliances, however, can be amixed blessing. Yes, aharsh sanctions regime might still gain additional supporters, but anIran with its back against thewall would probably be even more obstinate inits nuclear drive. After all, Iraq was aneasy target inthe first Gulf War precisely because it had abandoned its nuclear program. It had no weapons ofmass destruction touse as adeterrence threat. Similarly, Libya's Moammar Gadhafi exposed himself toa NATO onslaught byrelinquishing his weapons ofmass destruction.
Bycontrast, North Korea shows that defiance, rather than accommodation, is astrategy that works. That is why Syria, with North Korean assistance, tried todevelop anuclear program, which were presumably destroyed byIsrael's officially unacknowledged "Operation Orchard" in2007. Iran will not consider abandoning its nuclear insurance policy unless abroad agenda is agreed upon that addresses Iran's concerns as aregional power andsecures theimmunity ofits Islamist regime fromU.S. actions.
Albert Einstein's definition ofinsanity as "doing thesame thing over andover again andexpecting different results" could be applied tothe United States' Iran policy. Thediplomacy ofsanctions, ostracism andbrinkmanship has failed resoundingly. As Iran's uranium enrichment andother weapons development activities continue unabated, theU.S. needs tomake abreak with theold rules ofengagement.
By The Moscow Times
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