29 Mar 2024
Thursday 17 January 2013 - 14:14
Story Code : 17670

Iran-Turkey relations heading into a tough year

Mahmoud Ahmedinejad and Recep Tayyip ErdoganSince the advent of the Syrian Revolution and tightening transatlantic sanctions against Iran in 2011, Tehran and Ankara have had a particularly tough time maintaining a facade of mutual amity and cooperation.

Last December, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejadhastily cancelleda cultural trip to Turkey, where he was scheduled to meet Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the sidelines of a ceremony commemorating the 13th century Persian poet Jalal al-din Rumi. While Irans Mehr News Agency cited Ahmadinejads busy agenda as a pretext for the decision, it is widely believed that it came in response to the Iranian regimes admonition of the Turkish agreement to install NATO Patriot Missiles on its Southern border with Syria.

Then, earlier this year, Turkish President Abdullah Gl, in an interview with Foreign Affairs, went as far as to say, Turkey will not accept a neighboring country possessing weapons not possessed by Turkey herselfwe are not underestimating this matter in any way. What is striking about his statement is not so much the knee-jerk anti-proliferation diplomatic correctness echoed among NATO members officials, but rather the emphasis on the regional balance of power: Turkey will not allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon because that would mean Turkish vulnerability and Iranian superiority.

These tit-for-tat expressions of disenchantment underline the degree to which Turkish-Iranian relations have entered a renewed period of estrangement, after years ofprogressive rapprochementbetween Turkeys ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Irans clerical establishment, which saw Ankara emerge as Tehrans key energy partner as well as interlocutor with Washington.

Although the recent discord is neither a novelty (the Safavid and Ottoman empires competed for regional hegemony for centuries) nor a big surprise, what is most astonishing is how the very same issues that served as the linchpin of Iran-Turkish partnership in recent years namely Syria and the Iranian nuclear conundrum are now pitting the two neighbors against each other.

Yet one thing that continues to bind the two countries is the simple, old-fashioned issue of hydro carbon riches. This is precisely why both sides continue to exercise caution with their mutual engagements, includingSyrias future, despite occasional rhetorical flare-ups. Indeed, Turkey hasheavily resistedWashingtons recent calls for reduction of energy imports from Iran (and the suspension of precious metals trade as payment), underscoring the importance of bilateral energy relations.

However, with the Iranian nuclear saga entering a crucial stage of high-stakes negotiations this year, and the Syrian revolution turning into an all-out civil war, both sides are headed for a decisive moment in their bilateral ties.

As early as 2010, Iran and Turkey projected an image of solid partnership, anchored on a straightforward bargain: Turkey needed Iran for energy security and international influence while Tehran needed its neighbor to resist sanctions and reach out to the West. The partnership, albeit transient and conditional, was multifaceted, covering a variety of issues ranging from trade, finance and energy to cultural exchanges and politico-security cooperation.

While Turkish and Iranian security forces aresaid to have jointly engagedKurdish separatist groups on multiple occasions, Ankarahas also playeda prominent role in facilitating Iran-West nuclear talks, culminating in the 2010 Brazil-Turkey-sponsored nuclear swap deal, followed by the Istanbul I (2011) and Istanbul II (2012) high-level nuclear talks between Iran and the 6-world powers P5+1 group.

However, at the heart of their relationship lies a key economic issue: (i) Turkeyshigh energy import-dependence, 93 percent in oil and 95 percent in natural gas (2008 figures) and (ii) its over-reliance, in that regard, on Russia, from which itimported 66 percentof its gas in 2005. While Irans vast hydrocarbon reserves are important to Turkeys energy security, the two sides have also laid their gaze on abroader trans-regional pipeline network, which could transform both sides into global energy brokers. In 2011, bilateral tradestood atmore than $16 billion,projected to expandup to $30 billion in 2015.

But by mid-2011, a promising partnership appeared to be heading for the rocks. Turkeyagreedto station a NATO missile defense shield on its Eastern borders, despite Irans vehement opposition, prompting Irans Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) aerospace chief, Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh,to warn, Should we be threatened, we will target NATOs missile defense shield in Turkey and then hit the next targets. This was followed byanother incidentwherein Iranian security-intelligence personnel temporarily detained and interrogated three Turkish academics on charges of espionage. Then, under US pressure, Ankarareducedits Iranian oil imports by as much as20 percent, followed by prevarications on itswillingnessto act as a financial intermediary through the state-owned Halk bank to process Irans multi-billion oil trade deals with countries such as India in effect, contributing to the economic siege on Iran.

As the Syrian revolution turned more violent and Turkey transformed into the Free Syrian Armys (FSA) main foreign patron,bilateral ties suffered further, with the Iranian Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Seyed Hassan Firouzabadiominously warningTurkey, it will be its turn [if it continues to] to help advance the warmongering policies of the United States in Syria. To up the ante, Iransuspendedvisa-free arrangements with Turkey and hinted at potentially downgrading security cooperation with Ankara, perhaps on the Kurdish issue.

Turkish officials struck back,accusingIran of hosting PKK rebels and contributing to the oppression of the Syrian people. Then came Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Blent Ar?nswarningthat his country would do whatever is required to counter the Iranian threat, ignoring incessant efforts by Irans foreign ministry to downplay statements from the security branches. To cool bilateral tensions, Ahmadinejad extended a letter of invitation to his Turkish counterpart toattendthe Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit in Tehran, to no avail. A few months later, when Turkey responded to Syrian artillery attacks by agreeing to host Patriot missile-defense systems, Iran along with Russia criticizedthe decision vehemently, fearing Ankara (or NATO) could also use it against Tehran in the future.

Depending on how the Syrian conflict unfolds, as well as the dynamics of the Iranian nuclear program, we may be entering a renewed phase of confrontation between the two powers in which either side can inflict considerable damage on the other. Serious recognition of that fact by leaders in both countries may yet work to stabilize an increasingly volatile relationship.

By Lobelog

 

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