Alwaght- The meeting of the Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan on August 9, 2016 in St. Petersburg has kept being one of the most significant topics for discussion and analysis in the media globally.

A majority of the analyses suggest that as Ankara gets close to Iran and Russia the speculations about a new Russian-Turkish-Iranian front in the region could be raised� a new front that sets as its priority a wide range of cooperation and coordination in a bid to end the 5-year-old Syrian crisis. As part of an accurate analysis, three major reasons can be presented as being behind Turkey's decision to re-establish relations with Russia and Iran:

1. Putting periodic pressures on the US and the EU

Following the establishment of the modern Republic of Turkey in 1923 the Turkish officials have always made Ankara as part of the Western coalition in West Asia region and as an ally for the US. During the past decades, Turkey held the dream and bid for joining the European Union. After 2002, the time that Justice and Development Party (AKP) rose to power, Ankara more seriously followed steps to join the European bloc, but the Islamist ruling party never managed to get the country into the EU. Since 2002, Turkey started fundamental reforms as part of attempts to meet the standards needed for the countries to get membership of the EU. But in past two years it appeared that Turkey changed course of its EU membership efforts. The new view does not include doing domestic reforms that are aimed at qualifying Turkey to be member of the EU. Instead, Ankara has adopted the policy of threatening and putting strains on the European bloc. After 2014, the issue of the refugees and opening of the Turkish borders to allow them to cross the Turkish territories in their way to Europe have turned into a considerable challenge for the European politicians. The Turkish officials used the problem as a trump card to press the Europeans. Now and in the present conditions, Ankara uses the policy of closeness to Tehran and Moscow to press Europe to accede to Turkey joining the 28-nation bloc.

On the other side, closeness to Iran and Russia is an instrument Erdogan uses to pressure the US into quitting backing of the Syrian Kurds as the fighting goes on across Syria. Over the past year the Turkish and American interests moved in a collision course over the Syrian Kurds issue.

Furthermore, the US support for the military operations of the Syrian Kurds who are fighting under the name of Syrian Democratic Forces that were founded in late 2015 by Washington's arrangements has deepened the gaps between the two all-time allies, the US and Turkey. Similarly, the Turkish officials are considering the Russian-Iranian camp as a tool to press Washington to amend its supportive stances about the Kurdish forces of Syria.

2. Weakening the Syrian Kurds and ending their self-proclaimed federal government

After the spark of the Syrian crisis in 2011, the Kurds gained historic chance in north of the country to hold a degree of political practice freedom. Making official their democratic autonomy in 2014 by connecting the three cantons of Afrin, Kobani, and the Island was a turning point for the Kurds in northern Syria. Additionally, founding the Rojava federal government in March 2016 and launching joint military operations between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the US to liberate the town of Manbij in northern Aleppo more than ever paved the way for officialization of the mechanism of governing of the Syrian Kurds. But Turkey since the beginning of the conflict in 2011 was against power gaining of the Kurdistan Democratic Union (PYD) as it sees the Kurdish group as Syrian affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), an arch-enemy of Ankara.

The diplomacy of the Syrian Kurds after 2011 enabled them to successfully cooperate with Russia, Iran, the US, and the European countries, something sent Ankara concerned even further. Now by shifting his foreign policy Erdogan seeks to convince Iran and Russia to lift their support for the Kurds and to tell Tehran that they pose common threat to Iran and Turkey. In fact, the key goal and worry of Turkey in Syria is to foil the Kurds' plan to build a Kurdish state in Syria. Therefore, Ankara is striving after convincing Iran and Russia to halt support and to open several new frontlines against the Kurds and so to deal a heavy blow to them in Syria. Turkey wants the Kurdish forces to be involved in fighting in three frontlines so that they receive great military losses on the ground in Syria. Turkey eyes engaging the Kurds in three fronts that include fighting with the ISIS terrorist group, Ankara-backed Syrian opposition forces, and the central Syrian government. In recent days, the reports appeared to suggest that clashes sparked between the forces of the Syrian government and the Kurdish forces in Al-Hasakah province in far northeastern corner of Syria.

3. Moving out of passiveness and securing a share in future of Syria

Still another reason of Turkey for closeness to Iran-Russia camp has something to do with Ankara�s ongoing diplomatic and political failures in Syria and the region. Just against the imaginations of the Turkish officials not only after six years the government of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad did not fall but also due to the Russian and Iranian backing the central government of Syria obtained new strength in the face of the opposing forces.� Founding the Jaish al-Fatah militant group by Turkey and Saudi Arabia and its initial advances in March 2016 made the Turks optimistic about successes in the battlefields of Syria. But Russian anti-terror intervention in Syria in late September 2015 turned the equation on its head, and everything went against Ankara�s will. The progresses of the Damascus government in north of the country since early 2016, specifically since March after it managed to break blockade of the two strategic towns of Nubl and Al-Zahraa in northwestern Aleppo and encircle Aleppo, made Ankara to face the fact that it was the loser of the Syrian conflict.

As a result of these developments the current officials of Turkey are trying to move closer to Tehran and Moscow to restore role as a key player in Syria.

They hope that they can thwart and dismantle the Kurdish federal government in Syria even if this comes at the price of accepting President Assad remaining in power. Erdogan and the Turkish PM Binali Y?ld?r?m think that by a collaboration with Russia and Iran they can step out of the current state of passiveness they are in and so secure a hand in management of the Syrian crisis.

By Alwaght