29 Mar 2024
Thursday 28 May 2015 - 16:56
Story Code : 166188

To fight the Islamic State, Obama joins hands with Iran's proxies

U.S. officials, stunned by the Islamic States gains, are making a risky bet on Shiite militias in Iraq.

For weeks, the Obama administration insisted it was winning the war against the Islamic State, telling reporters that its pinpoint airstrikes and military advice were rolling back the terrorist groups stunning territorial gains in Iraq.

But now, Obamas foreign policy team finds itself relying on Iran-backed Shiite militias in a high-stakes bid to retake Ramadi, a provincial capital where dozens of American soldiers once died battling hordes of Sunni insurgents.

Victory in Ramadi, if it comes, could undermine the very thing President Barack Obama is trying to achieve: a unified, stable Iraq where Iran doesnt call the shots.
Iraqi government forces will be stiffened by thousands of religiously motivated Shiite irregular troops that the White House had once hoped to keep away from Anbar province, the heartland of Iraqs Sunni Muslims.

The Shiite militias may bring the manpower to reverse the militants recent advances, but their entry into Anbar also poses major strategic problems for the Obama administration, which has reluctantly agreed to their role in the Ramadi offensive.

Administration officials understand well the risk that sectarian bloodshed between Sunnis and Shiites might empower the Islamic State, also known as ISIL or ISIS. After the Shiite militias helped drive ISIS from the northeastern town of Amerli last September, militia fighters raided Sunni villages and neighborhoods in the area looting, burning and abducting, according to a recent Human Rights Watch report.

If Ramadi is retaken by a Shiite militia and you have further looting, abuses or atrocities by the Shiites, or if Ramadi is ethnically cleansed of some of its Sunni population, youre only going to further drive the Sunnis into the arms of ISIS, said Rep. Adam Schiff of California, the top Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee.

The militias are deeply distasteful to Washington for other reasons. Many are effectively proxies for Iran some openly display images of the late Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomenei and serve to extend Tehrans influence in Baghdad. There is also an emotional factor: Shiite fighters killed numerous Americans in the wake of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, and the prospect of cooperating with them enrages many in the U.S. military.

Still, given the continued poor performance of the Iraqi army which Defense Secretary Ash Carter recently said lacks the will to fight the U.S. is hard-pressed to dismiss the punch the militias can throw in the battle against the Islamic State. A senior U.S. official estimated that the mostly Baghdad-based Shiite militias number around 80,000 men.

Weve been concerned all along about the power and influence of the Shiite militias, said Derek Chollet, a former Obama administration assistant secretary of defense for international affairs now with the German Marshall Fund. But we have to acknowledge the reality that the Shiite militias are capable.

After Iraqs army crumbled in the face of an Islamic State offensive last summer, Obama said the U.S. would retrain a nonsectarian Iraqi military and send aid to a new and inclusive government in Baghdad. But both the training program and political reform in Baghdad are moving slowly.

For instance, Ramadi was vulnerable in part because Shiite leaders in Baghdad have blocked a measure to create a Sunni national guard force in Anbar province that would empower local tribes to fight the militants.

The sectarian divisions were illustrated further this week when the Shiite militias announced their Ramadi operations slogan: Labaik ya Hussein. That translates roughly to At your service, Hussein, a reference to a Shiite religious icon that could anger the Sunni residents of the very city the militias are supposed to help liberate. The Pentagon on Tuesday called the slogan unhelpful and the Iraqis quickly changed it to At your service, Iraq.

Some Obama allies are losing hope that the inclusive, unified Iraq that Obama calls for is achievable. I cannot envision a set of circumstances where the Sunnis feel there is a government in Baghdad they feel is worth fighting for, said Rep. Adam Smith of Washington, the top Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee. I understand why major policymakers are reluctant to make that conclusion, because theres not a great set of options, he added.

Obama administration officials insist things are not so dire. But an Iraqi government official warned that there is significant local support for ISIS in Ramadi. The official said such support allowed sleeper cells to operate in the city and initiate the wave of suicide attacks that led to the collapse of our defenses. He added that the challenge is to convince more and more tribes to jump ship and fight alongside the government.

For now, the U.S. is focused on training the Iraqi army, a painfully slow process. Officially, American trainers at four locations in the country are training 12 Iraqi divisions. But the number of divisions being trained is actually closer to four or six, according to Kenneth Pollack, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution with close ties to the Pentagon.

When asked whether the training program has slowed, a senior administration official replied, It is not a matter of policy that we have scaled back our goal and said the Pentagon could provide details. The Pentagon did not offer immediate comment.

The senior administration official said the U.S. has trained 7,000 Iraq troops since last fall, but that many are protecting Baghdad and none of those freshly trained forces are now in the fight around Ramadi.

After a $25 billion investment by the United States, the Iraqi army numbered 210,000 at its 2009 peak. Poor management and mass desertions have left it at closer to 50,000 combat-ready soldiers, U.S. officials say.

With a shortage of army troops available to rescue Ramadi, the Shiite militias are moving on the city at the invitation of Anbars Sunni leaders. U.S. officials hope that will defuse talk of an invading Shiite force, even if the invitation was born of desperation.

U.S. officials themselves arent much more enthusiastic about working with the Shiite fighters.

In March 26 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the head of U.S. Central Command, Gen. Lloyd Austin, recalled three tours in Iraq commanding troops who were brutalized by some of these [Shiite] militias.

I will not and I hope we never coordinate or cooperate with the [Shiite] militias, Austin said.

Since then, U.S. officials have said they will support militias with airstrikes so long as they are under the command of Iraqs central government. During the recent battle to retake the city of Tikrit, the U.S. halted airstrikes when it became clear that Iranian commanders were on the ground directing the Shiite fighters.

The militias were unable to drive ISIS from Tikrit without American support. But they have proved effective elsewhere, including Amerli, and have been instrumental in the defense of Baghdad and Shiite holy sites against ISIS.

A Shiite combat role in Sunni-dominated Anbar could backfire and play into the hands of the Islamic State. Although far more extreme in its religious views than most Sunnis, the militant group says it is liberating the countrys Sunnis from oppression by the Shiite-led government that emerged from the U.S. occupation.

If the militias must be used in Anbar, the U.S. should ensure they answer directly to Iraqi army commanders under clear rules of conduct, said Sarah Margon, Washington director for Human Rights Watch.

There is a cost to letting the militias rescue Ramadi, she said. Our policy cant be, fight ISIS and support the government at all costs.

But while increased reliance on the Shiite militias may not be ideal, the White House has few other choices for now, said James Jeffrey, a former U.S. ambassador to Iraq under Obama.

All policy, all strategy, is about priorities, Jeffrey said. At this point, the strategy is smashing ISIS.
This article was written by Michael Crowley for Politico on May 28, 2015. Michael Crowley is POLITICOs senior foreign affairs correspondent, covering foreign policy and national security with a Washington focus. Prior to joining POLITICO in October 2014, Michael was chief foreign affairs correspondent for TIME magazine.

 
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