US President Barack Obama has made a valiant move by nominating the former US senator from Nebraska, Chuck Hagel, as the next secretary of defense, defying an avalanche of accusations that Hagel is too "tough" on Israel and too "soft" on Iran.
A spokesperson for the furious "Jewish Lobby", Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz, has lambasted Obama's decision as a "bad choice for peace". This presumably implies that Iran will be less inclined to make a diplomatic deal knowing that the threat of military action is remote, in light of Hagel's past pronouncements against striking Iran.

What Dershowitz and other like-minded US pundits have�overlooked is that US-led coercive diplomacy has had no effect in weakening Iran's determination to pursue a civilian nuclear program - persuasive diplomacy has a much better chance of success with Tehran.

By choosing Hagel, who is also in favor of dialogue with Palestine's Hamas and Lebanon's Hezbollah, Obama has sent an important signal regarding his desire to give his failed "Iran engagement" policy a new lease of life. Obama's pick for secretary of state, the Massachusetts Senator John Kerry, is also likely to be more in sync with Obama's Iran policy than the outgoing Hillary Clinton ever was.

In a 2009 interview with London's Financial Times, Kerry labeled the demand on Iran to give up its uranium enrichment program as "ridiculous." [1] A neo-realist who prioritizes the role of diplomacy, Kerry will undoubtedly strengthen Obama's foreign policy hands - which are somewhat tied by the congress at the moment.

Assuming that Hagel survives the grueling nomination process, then the Kerry-Hagel duet can devise a sound, step-by-step, approach that would have a decent potential of yielding positive results, potentially melting Iran's resistance to entering into a "face-saving" deal with Washington.

Like Kerry, Hagel has in the past hinted at recognizing Iran's nuclear rights. In a recent interview with Al-Monitor, Hagel referred approvingly to another Al-Monitor article that urged the White House to take President Mahmud Ahmadinejad's offer of stopping the 20% enrichment if the outside world was willing to guarantee the delivery of nuclear fuel to Iran. [2]

The question is, of course, whether or not Tehran is still interested in such a deal. It has already managed to convert the enriched uranium into plates for the Tehran reactor, a technological achievement that simultaneously confirms the importance of Iran's possession of an independent fuel cycle.

Fereydoun Abbasi, the head of Iran's Atomic Organization, has told the domestic media that Iran will not compromise its right to 20% enrichment. Yet, it is abundantly clear to anyone familiar with the multilateral nuclear negotiations that there will be no Western concessions on sanctions on Iran unless Iran is willing to make precisely such compromises.

The Iran nuclear crisis stands an good chance of de-escalation in 2013 if both sides show the necessary flexibility. Conditions include the US and its allies agreeing to tolerate Iran's enrichment program at a low ceiling and higher degree of transparency, and Iran consenting to a technical formula regarding its enriched pile of uranium. The latter could mandate inspections, and even a fuel swap, on the condition of a major relaxation of international sanctions.

Nuclear talks can also be telescoped to regional security issues, with the US's Afghanistan exit strategy standing to benefit greatly from an earnest security dialogue with Tehran and Syria's crisis on the table.

This is of course an ideal scenario should the White House's moves prove capable of steering the US's Middle East policy in the right direction.

The largest obstacle is off course Israel, the US's closest ally in the region.

Israel is inherently opposed to any US-Iran deal that would culminate in the preservation of Iran's nuclear program intact and, Obama's biggest challenge in the weeks and months to come is striking a balanced approach that does not antagonize the powerful "Jewish Lobby".

Another potential problem ahead is the risk of Obama veering back towards a greater coercive policy. This would suggest that he had again pursued a half-baked policy that falls short of achieving the desired results. He needs to display patience and reject an onrush of negative input from the opponents such as European allies and the conservative government in London.

One reason this might occur is political fissures among the "5 +1" nations (UN Security Council's five permanent members plus Germany). The grouping has already been unable to revamp its Iran policy, which is long on demands and short on tangible incentives, such as a concrete offer on reducing or relaxing sanctions.

Any deal offered to and accepted by Iran would require congressional approval in US, but the chances of Obama convincing a congressional majority sold to Iran-bashing on anything less than a full suspension of Iran's nuclear activities is rather slim. This would mean an Iran deal by the executive branch that would be unpopular in congress and likely cause a political firestorm, unless of course Israel puts its stamp of approval on the deal.

The latter is not a long-shot by any means, much as it seems improbable right now, depending on what Israel may gain on other fronts such as its expansionist policy, which has been barely tolerated by the Obama administration.

A "Faustian bargain" of one sort or another is in the realm of possibilities, another is an Israeli concession on the peace process in exchange for a get-tougher Washington policy on Iran.

What is improbable, however, is real US pressure on Israel to negotiate in earnest with the Palestinians, which can only emerge if Washington dares to cut military, intelligence, and financial assistance. This is highly unlikely and, instead, we are apt to see a continuation and even deepening of US's security commitment to Israel during the next four years.

Iran's concerns
As for Iran, which will have its own presidential election in June, the stakes are relatively high and the biggest challenge is to reach a political consensus on the right response to an American initiative, given the risks posed by political factionalism and even fragmentation susceptible of foreign policy paralysis in the coming months.

Reeling under the "crippling sanctions," Tehran harbors a natural interest in a deal with Washington that would unfetter the national economy from the suffocating pressure of comprehensive sanctions that are imposed both unilaterally and multilaterally.

The problem is, as in the past, how to balance any such deal with the regime's prerogative of saving face both at home and the region, without which its image and credibility may suffer grievously. This is a formidable challenge that would need to be taken into consideration by the outside powers engaged in negotiation with Iran.

Simultaneously, Iran's national security concerns would have to be taken into consideration as well, principally because of the "nuclear capability" derived from the enrichment know-how. Consequently, the Western powers should never lose sight of the fact that their request from a country to dispossess itself of the high-value nuclear capability does not come cheap and that they should be prepared to put serious incentives, with "firm commitments" on the table.

In return, what Iran can conceivably offer is the objective guarantee that its capability would remain perpetually latent and would not be manifest in the actual bombs. This would essentially mean living with a nuclear potential Iran, and at the moment the prevailing sentiment in the Western capitals is oceans away from this. Whether or not the Kerry-Hagel duet can bring a timely reconciliation of US policy with this (rather inescapable) reality remains to be seen.

By Asia Times

 

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